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THE VALUATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF RATE MAKING
By E. J. Plunkett of the Denver Bar
PUBLIC UTILITY is defined as: An enterprise which
has dedicated its property to a public use, and supplies
a commodity or renders a service of a public necessity
to the public. The enterprise may be under public or private
ownership.
The valuation of a public utility for the purpose of rate
making is only one of the powers and duties of the governing
commission or board. However, the problem of valuation
is the chief and most persistent difficulty, encountered by
courts, commissions and the utilities, in the regulation of utili-
ties. The power to regulate utilities is not a matter of con-
tention. Ever since the Granger cases, particularly Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876), it has been conceded that
public utilities may be regulated under the police power of a
state.
The proper theory of the valuation of public utilities has
been an unending source of trouble to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, State Commissions, State and Federal Courts
and the United States Supreme Court.
It is thought by many of the lay public that the public
utilities and public service corporations in fixing rates strike
upon an arbitrary figure as the rate which is to be charged the
public for the commodity or service used. This is not the case.
Aside from the fact that public utilities sometimes contract
with a municipality as to the rate to be charged the public for a
commodity or service, the usual procedure is by the valuation
of the property of the public utility for the purpose of arriv-
ing at a fair and just rate, fair and just both to the public and
the utility. This procedure is comparatively recent and has
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developed since the decision in 1898 of Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466.
When a valuation is found it is denominated the rate
base. A public utility is justly entitled to earn on the mone-
tary value of its property used and useful the same rate of
return that it would or could receive if the value of its
property, in money, were invested in good securities at the
market rate of return. Consequently, one of the first steps
to be taken in establishing a rate to be charged the public by
a public utility is to ascertain the fair value of the property
used and useful by the utility in supplying a commodity or
service at the time of the appraisal.
This article is to treat more the different theories of valu-
ation and the disputatious differences between the different
theories rather than the elements and things that go to make
up the total final value or rate base arrived at under whatever
theory of valuation is used.
VALUATION THEORIES.
The theories or methods used in the valuation of public
utilities property are:
(a) Original cost, sometimes called Actual cost or His-
torical Cost.
(b) Cost of Reproduction or Replacement Cost.
(c) The Prudent Investment Theory. (proposed)
(d) Present Value.
Cost and value in public utility regulations are not synon-
ymous. Advocates of original cost or original cost to date
contend that no greater "value" should be placed upon a plant
or system than it actually cost to date and that therefor the
"value" to be given a particular plant or system is its "cost".
To determine this cost under this theory recourse must be had
to the records or books of the company. It has invariably de-
veloped, in the earlier cases, that the records were lost or
the books were not properly kept, and were therefore of no
evidentiary value. Again no value is given to the unearned
increment, e. g. in real estate, or to franchise value, strategic
value, going value, good-will, or earning power. The real
estate may have been, as often was the case, in the first instance
a gift from the community to induce the establishment of a
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public utility in the community. This theory, for many rea-
sons, was not satisfactory to the utilities. Nor were the courts,
in many instances, favorable to this theory. In Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, Judge Peckham said:
"And we concur with the court below in holding that the value of the
property is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry is made regarding
the rates. If the property which legally enters into the consideration of the
question of rates has increased in value since it was acquired, the company is
entitled to the benefit of such increase. This is, at any rate, the general rule."
In the Minnesota Rates Cases, Justice Hughes, now Chief
Justice, announced:
"It is clear that in ascertaining the present value we are not limited to
the consideration of the amount of the actual investment. If that has been
reckless or improvident, losses may be sustained which the community does
not underwrite. As the company may not be protected in its actual invest-
ment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the making of a just return
for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be
more than its cost."
Some more equitable rule to determine fair value had to
be evolved, and out of the dissatisfaction with the original cost
theory grew the Cost of Reproduction theory. Cost of repro-
duction while not amenable to strict definition may be some-
what defined as follows: That amount of money or estimated
investment which would be required to reproduce the same
or existing plant or system if the existing plant were non-
existent, but not to reproduce an equally effective plant.
In estimating the "cost of reproduction new" of an exist-
ing railroad, Vanderblue in Railroad Valuation depicts the
following mental picture:
"The road bed is assumed to disappear, and in place of the smoothed
and well-tended grade the conditions met at the time of construction are
restored. The right of way and terminal properties pass into private hands
to be devoted to the same use as adjoining tracts. The equipment vanishes,
the working force is scattered. The very corporate existence ceases. * * *
The population, rural and urban, does not desert the line of the road; busy
factories and warehouses stand at the edge of a primeval right of way, which
is overgrown with trees and underbrush. Everything awaits the advent of
the courageous promoter who shall place surveying parties in the field, secure
the charter, arrange financial matters: in short, set 6 ut to restore the plant
of the road which in imagination has been made to disappear, yet which in
fact exists. What will it cost?"
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The cost, arrived at under this theory, will be cost of repro-
duction new. But the cost of reproduction theory did not
fully meet the need and was subjected to as much criticism
as the original cost theory. Whitten in his work, Valuation
of Public Service Corporations, 2nd ed. Sec. 324, says:
"Cost of reproduction may mean the cost of a substitute plant of the
most modern, approved design capable of performing the same service as the
existing plant. If the old plant were wiped out, what would it cost at present
to construct a plant capable of performing the service now performed by the
old plant? In the case of a water plant, perhaps an entirely new source of
supply would be used and the distribution system radically changed; in the
case of a gas plant, a different process of production employed and a few
large gas holders substituted for many small ones; in the case of an electric
plant, larger units of production employed; in the case of a railroad, there
might be a radical relocation and realignment of roadbed, and important
changes in methods of construction. The present value of the old plant is
measured by the cost of an equally efficient new plant less an allowance for
the depreciated condition of the old plant. This seems to be the most logical
method of arriving at present structural value. One difficulty in applying it
arises from the fact that in many cases it is exceedingly difficult and expensive
to determine on an equally efficient substitute plant."
Further in this same work at page 646, it is said:
"The difficulties of the reproduction method were also discussed in
Fuhrmann v. Cataract Power and Conduit Company, * * * Chairman Stevens
said: 'This method of ascertaining the fair amount of the investment, although
it has been treated with favor, is also subject to severe criticism. This first
arises from the practical impossibility of ascertaining with any reasonable
degree of accuracy the cost of reproduction new. This impossibility has been
demonstrated in most attempts which are made.' "
Pond on Public Utilities, 3rd ed. Sec. 594, says:
"Reproduction less depreciation.-The adoption of the theory of repro-
duction is attended with practically all the difficulties of that of original cost,
and the application of either must be attended with a reduction of the amount
of the depreciation which the plant has sustained, except so far as its parts
may have been repaired or replaced; nor does the theory of the original cost
or the cost of reproduction take into account a valuation of the plant as a
going concern with an established income. This element of value is generally
accepted and is to be added to original or reproduction costs."
Of late years the Prudent Investment Theory has been
advanced by some authorities as the proper rule to use in
valuation cases. This theory is not in general use and is only
recommended. Justice Brandeis is an advocate of the pru-
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dent investment theory. However, the United States Supreme
Court is not of the same opinion as Justice Brandeis. Prudent
Investment means what it implies, i. e., investments made
prudently. It precludes the idea of giving value to invest-
ments made with poor or bad judgment, losses sustained
through poor management, excessive salaries and excessive
promotional and organization expenses. This feature of the
prudent investment theory, of course, is not objectionable to
the fair mind, but in the last analysis it is akin to original or
actual cost and differs from actual cost in that actual cost may
embody imprudent investments and expenditures. In the
Southwestern Bell Telephone case, 259 U. S. 318, Justice
Brandeis, in dissenting from the majority opinion, said:
"The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the rate base and
the amount of the capital charge as the measure of the rate of return would
give definiteness to these two factors involved in rate controversies which are
now shifting and treacherous, and which render the proceedings peculiarly
burdensome and largely futile. Such measures offer a basis for decision which
is certain and stable. The rate base would be ascertained as a fact, not
determined as matter of opinion. It would not fluctuate with the market
price of labor, or materials, or money. It would not change with hard times
or shifting populations. It would not be distorted by the fickle and varying
judgments of appraisers, commissions, or courts. It would, when once made
in respect to any utility, be fixed for all time, subject only to increases to
represent additions to plant, after allowance for the depreciation included
in the annual operating charges."
There is another suggested test to determine value. It is
Outstanding Capitalization. Some persons contend that the
value of a utility is to be measured by its outstanding capitali-
zation. Advocates of this method advance the argument that
since the issuance of stocks and bonds of public utilities is
under the control of the regulating body that the rate of return
to the utility should have some relation to the outstanding se-
curities. But when it is considered that it is the valuation of
the physical property of the utility that is sought and not its
nominal "paper" value it is clear that there may be a wide
discrepancy between actual present value of a company and
its outstanding capitalization.
Present value is the true and only test of the fair value
of a utility, be that present value arrived at by one or all of
the known theories. The United States Supreme Court in
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Smyth v. Ames, before the term "Present Value" was coined
used the phrase "the present as compared with the original
cost of construction."
Many proposed suggestions to determine fair value were
offered as the true test, such as the valuation for taxation,
valuation for condemnation proceedings and valuation for
bargain and sale or market value. For obvious reasons these
proposed methods met with failure. Tax laws differ widely.
Taxation may in part be based upon market value and earn-
ing power of a utility. The market value and earning power
of a utility is dependent upon the rate to be charged. It is,
therefore, folly to use taxation value to determine rates when
market value or earnings are not established until the rate is
established. The same is true of the condemnation theory.
Intangibles are valued in condemnation proceedings but not
all intangibles are valued in rate making proceedings. As to
the purchase and sale or market value theory, apart from
other objections, a very material objection is that it isn't every
day that a public utility has a ready and willing purchaser
or a quoted market value. Market value depends upon earn-
ings, earnings depend upon rates, and rates are what are sought
to be established. It is vicious circle reasoning.
THE CASES.
Smyth v. Ames, supra, in valuation proceedings for rate
making is the landmark case, and though decided thirty-twoyears ago is still contr6lling, notwithstanding that Justices
Holmes, Stone, and Brandeis do not agree with it. In it the
matters to be taken into consideration in valuation proceeding
for rate making are thus set out:
"In order to ascertain that value the original cost of construction, the
amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and markef value
of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of con-
struction, the probable earning capacity under particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded
in estimating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to
ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public
convenience. On the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is
that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than -the
services rendered by it are reasonably worth."
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Many authorities quarrel with this decision, but Justice
Hughes, in the Minnesota Rate Cases, Shepherd v. Simpson,
230 U. S. 352, adhered to its principles. Likewise did Justice
McReynolds, who wrote the majority opinion in the O'Fallon
case, St. Louis and O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. U. S., 42 S. Ct. 384,
(May 20, 1929), the opinion saying:
"The elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate
making purposes have been pointed out many times by this Court. Smyth
v. Ames."
The O'Fallon case was a recapture case and not a rate making
case, but the elements of valuation are the same in recapture
cases as in rate making cases.
The decided cases follow Smyth v. Ames in general, with
some deviations dependent upon the facts of the cases. The
principal cases are Reagan v. Farmers, etc., 154 U. S. 362,
Knoxville v. Knoxville, etc., 212 U. S. 1, Minnesota Rate
Cases, supra, Southwestern Bell Tele. Co. v. Pub. Service,
etc., 262 U. S. 276, Bluefield, etc., v. Pub. Service Com., 262
U. S. 679, McCardle v. Ind., etc., 272 U. S. 400.
Whenever a proposed valuation and rate is fixed by a
regulating commission or board, which is not satisfactory to
the utility or public service corporation, the utilities seek an
injunction setting up the allegation that the valuation and rate
discriminate, and are confiscatory and deprive the utility of
its property without due process of law under Articles V
and XIV of the Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion or the similar provisions in state constitutions.
The utilities now advocate the cost of reproduction the-
ory. William Jennings Bryan was counsel for the State of
Nebraska in Smyth v. Ames and in that case contended, and
most firmly, that the true test of the value of a railroad for rate
making purposes was the cost of reproduction. The railroads
then were contending that the only right basis of value for the
purpose of rate making was original cost. Were the case of
Smyth v. Ames to be reargued now by the same attorneys who
argued in 1898, they would simply trade theories and could,
with grace, exchange briefs, each contending for a change of
theory. Economic conditions and the changing value of the
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dollar are the real causes responsible for the differences of
opinion concerning valuation theories.
It would seem that some more satisfactory and quasi per-
manent method of determining fair value is desired by all con-
cerned, not to forget the consumer and stock and bond holder.
Of late years the consumer of the commodity of a public
service company-public utility-is also in many instances a
holder of the company's stock or bond. If he as a consumer
demands a lower rate for the commodity he uses, he can only
expect to receive a decreased dividend on his security. If he
wishes a larger dividend on regular average earnings, he can
only expect to pay a higher rate for the commodity or service.
He is in a dilemma.
The State of New York has recently appointed a Special
Legislative Commission on the Revision of Public Service
Commission Law with the idea of formulating policies and
principles dealing with public utilities. To allow the public
utility, in valuation proceedings, a present fair value is beside
the point. The difficulty lies in the method or ways of arriv-
ing at the fair value. This commission is divided as to which
of two plans is the more feasible. The majority recommend
that the local State Commission contract with the utilities re-
specting their individual valuations for ten year periods,
thus crystallizing or "freezing" a definite valuation for ten
years, allowing, however, for value fluctuations according to
the swing of plrices of labor and materials and other factors
affecting values. The minority desire to- qstablish a perma-
nent "frozen" valuation based on the theory of prudent in-
vestment. The minority plan is called the Bauer plan, Bauer
being the author of several works on public utility regulation.
Whether the rule laid down in Smyth v. Ames is correct
or not or whether it should be overruled remains to be seen.
Eminent jurists and writers contend the rule is obsolete and
does not meet the changed economic conditions. The criti-
cism of Smyth v. Ames by Justice Brandeis has much merit.
His theory might, perhaps, establish a fixed method of valua-
tion that would protect the rights of all concerned. He says
in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case, supra, at page
308:
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"What is now termed the prudent investment is, in essence, the same
thing as that which the court has always sought to protect in using the term
present value. Twenty-five years ago, when Smyth v. Ames was decided,
it was impossible to ascertain with accuracy, in respect to most of the utilities,
in most of the states in which rate controversies arose, what it cost in money
to establish the utility; or the money cost with which the utility was estab-
lished; or what income had been earned by it; or how the income had been
expended. It was, therefore, not feasible, then, to adopt, as the rate base,
the amount properly invested or, as the rate of fair return, the amount of
the capital charge. Now the situation is fundamentally different. These
amounts are, now, readily ascertainable in respect to a large, and rapidly
increasing, proportion of the utilities. The change in this respect is due to the
enlargement, meanwhile, of the powers and functions of state utility com-
missions. The issue of securities is now, and for many years has been, under
the control of commissions, in the leading states. Hence the amount of capital
raised (since the conferring of these powers) and its cost are definitely known,
through current supervision and prescribed accounts, supplemented by inspec-
tion of the commission's engineering force. Like knowledge concerning the
investment of that part of the capital raised and expended before these broad
functions were exercised by the utifity commissions has been secured, in many
cases, through investigations undertaken later in connection with the issue of
new securities or the regulation of rates. The amount and disposition of
current earnings of all the companies are also known. It is, therefore, feasible
now to adopt as the measure of a compensatory rate-the annual cost, or
charge, of the capital prudently invested in the utility. And hence it should
be done."
Until some better theory is evolved Smyth v. Ames is the
guiding beacon.
Referring again to the recent action taken by the State of
New York in appointing a Special Legislative Committee
for the purpose of formulating policies and principles dealing
with public utilities, Bauer, in Public Utilities Fortnightly,
April 3, 1930, has written an article discussing the Bauer plan
and the Prendergast plan. In a foot-note he says:
"Since the above was written, the Revision Commission has made its
report to the New York Legislature. There was a majority and minority
report. The latter adopted the Bauer plan and incorporated it in a pro-
posed bill. The majority agreed that a fixed rate base and return are essen-
tial-to affective regulation, but instead of the mandatory provisions, it pro-
posed to include the plan in contracts between the state and the companies;
it doubted whether a mandatory system could be enforced against a shift to
higher or lower prices. The minority believed that the contract plan would
not be accepted by the companies on a reasonable basis. While it admitted
that there may be a constitutional question as to the mandatory provisions
when prices have risen or fallen sharply, it believed the policy would be
DICTA
sustained because of its inherent reasonableness and because of its necessity
on administrative and financial grounds."
It will be interesting to read the act that will be passed, if
passed, growing out of the "proposed bill". Perhaps out of
this action by the State of New York may spring a nucleus
from which may emerge a solution of the vexing and at the
present time refractory theories of valuation.
COLERIDGE DIDN'T TELL IT ALL
"In Xanadu did Kubla Kahn
A stately pleasure dome decree,
Where Alph, the sacred river ran,
Through caverns measureless to man,
Down to the sunless sea."
He ran the place a month or two
And kept things going pretty free,
And then his creditors put him through
Involuntary bankruptcy.
J. H. DENISON.
THE MILITARY COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES
By Samuel H. Sterling of the Denver Bar
OST laymen, and even some of the members of the Bar,Mdo not know that our present system of army courts-
martial has as distinguished an, ancestry and almost as
ancient a pedigree as our system of Common Law. During
the Middle Ages, in keeping with the ideas of that time, a
commander of any army, or any of the commanders of units
under him, had absolute and complete control over his soldiers,
even to the extent of pronouncing the death penalty summar-
ily. However, even during this period, in times of peace,
all soldiers were entitled to some form of a trial for any of-
fense committed by them. At this trial the commander sat as
the sole and only judge, but he was required to proceed thru
the formalities of the trial at that period, whatever they might
have been.
In our own country, the old "common law military" was
recognized as an actuality even before the Constitution was
adopted. All during the Revolutionary War, and under the
Articles of Confederation, the Commander-in-Chief of the
army was authorized to convene courts-martial in accordance
with the "common law military". Washington acted as one
of the judges during the winter at Valley Forge, and other
regular courts-martial were convened from time to time upon
order of General Washington.
Upon adoption of the Constitution the authorization for
a system of courts-martial was found in that provision in the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which excepts "cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger," from the Bill
of Rights, and from the procedure of the ordinary civil courts.
The Supreme Court has also interpreted that part of the
Second Article of the Constitution which makes the President
the "Commander-in-Chief" of the army and navy, as carrying
with it the power to convene courts-martial in accordance with
the ancient "common law military".
So much for the authorization of a system of courts-mar-
tial. The present system of courts-martial is the result of the
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passage of numerous acts by Congress, and the installation of
many ramifications of the acts by Presidents under their
authority as Commander-in-Chief. Congress, under its con-
stitutional power to make rules and regulations foi the govern-
ment of the land and naval forces, passed the Articles of War
(Chapter Two, National Defense Act of June 4, 1920) which
introduced many new features hitherto not used, and under
which the present system of courts-martial is conducted and
governed. The Articles of War really constitute the army
penal code, and are the basis for its code of criminal procedure.
They are supplemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial
prescribed by executive order of President Coolidge. The
Manual is, really, the army code of criminal procedure.
The jurisdiction vested by the Articles of War and the
Manual of Courts-Martial is by no means a mere emergency
investiture. It is the same in time of peace as in time of war,
and the courts-martial is a regular military tribunal, admin-
istering the military law, which is that law which governs the
military forces, alike in peace and in war, at all times and in
all places, wherever they may be. Of course, the jurisdiction
of the courts-martial extends only to criminal or tortious cases,
dealing with offenses charged against members of the military
establishment, but within its scope, it is not an inferior court.
As to cases within its jurisdiction its decision is final, as far
as review or further examination by any civil court or tribunal
is concerned.
The court is composed of commissioned officers appointed
by an authority holding a military command. Three kinds of
courts-martial exist in the army: the Summary Court-Martial,
one officer, usually the commanding officer of a troop or com-
pany, for the disposition of minor cases; the Special Court-
Martial, three or more officers for the trial of more serious
cases, which may adjudge confinement at hard labor in the
guard house or army disciplinary barracks with forfeiture or
detention of not exceeding two-thirds pay for not longer than
six months, but has no power to separate any person from the
military services; and, third, the General Court-Martial con-
sisting of five or more officers for the trial of serious cases.
The General Court-Martial may adjudge any punishment
warranted by law, including death, confinement either in the
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army disciplinary barracks or in a Federal penitentiary, dis-
missal of an officer, or dishonorable discharge of an enlisted
man.
Besides the officers constituting the court-martial, there
is an official prosecutor, called the Trial Judge Advocate, and
also an official defense counsel provided as part of the regular
-personnel of the court. The defense counsel and the Trial
Judge Advocate are both legal advisers of the Court, and
are also, usually, both officers of equal rank, thus intending
to show and convey an idea of equality in the representation
to the accused. The accused has the privilege of retaining
civilian counsel, if he so wishes, however, by actual experience
the soldiers have come to know and recognize the worth and
sincerity of defense counsel appointed for them, and usually
accept the appointed counsel.
Under the revision of the Articles of War in 1920, there
must be appointed, for all General Court-Martials, a Law
member. That is, one of the members of the Court-Martial
must be art officer of the Judge-Advocate General's Depart-
ment, or if one is not available for the purpose, the appointing
authority details another officer-selected-as specially quali-
fied to perform the duties of the law member. This law mem-
ber rules in open court on all interlocutory questions, other
than challenges, arising during the proceedings. Upon ques-
tions other than of the admissibility of evidence, the court does
have the power, by majority vote, to override his rulings; but,
in practice, rarely, if ever, does so. He is a member of the
court, and like the other members, has a single vote on the
findings and the sentence. A reporter and interpreter may be
appointed, and the necessary clerks and orderlies are detailed
for the trial.
After the arrest and confinement of the accused, a formal
written accusation is made consisting of "the technical charge"
and "specification". The charge merely indicates what Arti-
cle of War the accused has violated, while the specification
sets forth the specific facts and circumstances relied upon as
constituting the violation. Each specification, together with
the charge under which it is placed, constitutes a separate ac-
cusation, or indictment. Any person subject to military law
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may prefer charges, even tho at the time of preferment he is
himself a prisoner.
Upon the preferment of charges, immediate steps are
taken to draft the charge and specification. This is always
couched in simple language, a specimen of which, is:
Charge I: Violation of the 93rd Article of War.
Specification: In that Richard Roe, did, at Fort Logan, Colorado, on
or about May 13, 1930, feloniously take, steal, and carry away a diamond
ring, value about $100.00, the property of John Doe.
No charge is preferred for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation is made. Witnesses are examined, and
evidence is taken by the commanding officer present, and a
report is made of the charges accompanied by a statement of
the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. A recom-
mendation of the examining officer as to what disposition of
the case he suggests, and also a statement of any reasonable
ground for the belief that the accused is, or was at the time
of the offense, mentally defective, deranged, or abnormal, is
also sent in with the report. These charges are then forwarded
to the commanding officer who has the authority to appoint
a court-martial, along with any related papers and any avail-
able evidence of previous convictions. The appointing au-
thority may, in his discretion, suspend action on the charges,
pending a report of a medical examining board, appointed
for the purpose of examining an accused where the forward-
ing officer reports that in. his opinion the accused is, or was at
the time of the commission of the act, mentally unsound.
Before the trial begins, both the Judge Advocate (the
prosecution) and the defense are each allowed one peremptory
challenge of the judges who are appointed to sit in the trial,
except, of course, in a summary court-martial, since in that
case there is only the one officer acting as judge. If any of
the officers appointed as judges know of any reason why they
should not serve as judges, it is their duty to express these
reasons and ask that they be excused from sitting .as judges.
Any of the judges might also be challenged for cause on the
grounds that the challenged member is not competent or is
not eligible to serve on courts-martial; that he is not a member
of the court; that he is the accuser as to any offense charged;
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or that he has already come in contact with the case in some
manner, or will receive it as a reviewing authority, or for
other reasons. After the challenge is given and argument
heard, the court votes upon the challenge by secret written
ballot, and the majority vote governs as to whether the chal-
lenged member shall remain as a court member or not.
After the proceedings as to challenges are concluded, the
members of the court and trial judge advocate are sworn, each
taking an oath that he will endeavor to mete out Justice im-
partially, and judge the accused upon the evidence admitted.
After the oath is taken, the accused is arraigned and asked
how he intends to plead upon each specification. After this,
pleas may now be made to the jurisdiction, in abatement, in
bar of trial by reason of the Statute of Limitations, or by reason
of a former trial. The plea to the jurisdiction may be made
at the beginning of the trial or any time during the trial,
while the other pleas should be made at the beginning of the
trial. A motion to sever may be made by one of two or more
joint accused who wishes to be tried separately from the other
or others; or a motion to strike out on the grounds that the
specification does not state any crime or offense may be made.
These two motions should be made upon arraignment. A
motion for findings of not guilty may be made at the close of
the trial. A Nolle Prosequi may be entered by the prosecu-
tion upon order of the appointing authority upon the con-
clusion of the trial, but this can only be made by his order.
The trial is then continued in much the same order as a
civil trial. Both sides make their opening statement, the
prosecution puts on their witnesses, and the defense puts on
their witnesses. At the close of the trial, each side sums up
their case, and the court-martial then retires to render its
decision. After the judges have retired, they re-argue the case
among themselves as to the salient points or features of the
trial, and they then vote. Voting is by secret written ballot,
the members first voting as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused. A two-thirds vote of the members present is sufficient
for conviction and for the determination of the sentence; ex-
cept, in case of a general court-martial, to adjudge peniten-
tiary confinement for more than ten years, or for life, a three-
fourths vote is necessary; and that the death penalty can be
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imposed only by unanimous votes, both on the findings of
guilty, and for the imposition of the sentence. If the accused
is voted guilty, a second vote is then had as to his punishment.
Each judge can vote the penalty he believes should be im-
posed, and the majority voting a certain penalty imposes that
penalty upon the accused, except in case of a death penalty,
in which case the vote must be unanimous. All the members
must vote as to the penalty regardless of his vote upon the
findings.
An automatic appellate review is supplied for every gen-
eral court-martial trial. A transcript of record, including
the testimony, is given the accused, as a matter of right, and
without expense to him. The sentence imposed has no force
until formally approved by the commanding general or other
authority appointing the court; and this authority in turn
refers the record to the reviewing authority of his Staff Judge
Advocate or to the Judg- Advocate General. The Board of
Review, in the office of the Judge Advocate General, is a true
appellate court. However, execution of the sentence in the
meantime is not held up in the less important cases. In other
words, as to the serious sentences, there is an automatic ap-
peal, before execution; as to all the other cases an automatic
writ of error is given, which does not delay the execution of
the sentence. The sentence may be either affirmed, reversed,
or sent back for a new trial.
All the ordinary rules of admissibility of evidence applies
with equal stringency to a court-martial as well as a civil
trial. The Articles of War, besides providing for the usual
crimes and misdemeanors contained in any Code of Criminal
Procedure, also lists a series of purely military crimes, such
as, desertion, disobedience to orders, disrespect to superiors,
and acts dealing with military property, or with the relations
between a soldier and the civilian population.
In general, reviewing authorities for the army courts,
including the Board of Review and the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, are guided by substantially the same principles which
guide civilian, appellate courts. There is one difference, how-
ever, which at first glance must seem quite startling to a
member of the Bar. In 1916 an Article of War was adopted
providing that:
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"The proceedings of a court-martial shall not be held invalid, nor the
findings or sentence disapproved in any case on the grounds of improper ad-
mission or rejection of evidence or for any error as to any matter of pleading
or procedure unless in the opinion of the reviewing or confirming authority,
after an examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error
complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of an accused."
This reverses the presumption of fatality of error, but as a
matter of experience this eliminates many miscarriages of
justice, and avoids the necessity of many new trials, without,
in turn, imposing too much of an injustice upon the accused.
This detailed explanation of procedure applies mainly to
a general court-martial, but with only slight differences, this
is the procedure in a special court-martial, also. The sum-
mary court-martial being composed of only the one command-
ing officer deals only with smaller, less important cases, and
is more in the nature of a disciplinary court. The three things
in which the army in recent years has departed rather notably
from the practice of the civil courts are: First, the -reversal of
the presumption of the fatality of procedural errors in the
trial; Second, the automatic appellate review of every general
court-martial case, without any request by the accused and
without expense to him; and, Third, the institution of the
official defense counsel at the trial for every case, and as a
part of the regular personnel of the court.
in this bare skeleton of the general procedure of an army
courts-martial I have tried to show you how closely it re-
sembles and developed along the same lines as has the mother-
tree of law, our own common law. It is interesting not only
because of its age and ancestry, but because it has kept pace
and developed as fast as our civil procedure. In fact, not
only has it developed as fast as our civil procedure, but in
some instances mentioned above has far outstripped our civil
code of procedure, and can be pointed to with as much pride
as any of our civil agencies for the dispensation of Justice.
NOTES ON NEW BOOKS RECEIVED AT
SUPREME COURT LIBRARY*
Clark on Receivers. By Ralph E. Clark, of the Cincinnati Bar. 2nd Ed., 1929, 2
vols., pp. 2053. The W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati. The First edition pub-
lished in 1918 has proved its usefulness as an analytical treatise on the subject,
so much so perhaps that it has become the standard work on the subject. As
stated in the Preface to the Second Edition "The law has been developed and
expanded". While this work is said to be a treatise yet it is mostly used as a
reference work. The new edition is superior to the first in that it discusses more
fully the fundamental questions of Receivorship.
Corporate Advantages without Incorporation. By Edward H. Warren, Professor of
Law at Harvard. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1929, pp. 1012. The title
does not accurately defint the contents of the book. As stated in the introduction,
the scope of the book is "to inquire whether today it is proper for the courts to
treat a body of men who have united to further their financial interests as a legal
unit, when there is no legislative authority for so doing." The author then pro-
ceeds to investigate the various statutes on the questions involved and judicial
interpretation of same. In discussing the Colorado law a very interesting brief
is written on the construction of Secs. 48 and 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The work has real value and would be helpful to anyone making an extensive
examination of the law relating to unincorporated associations.
Code of Laws of the United States. 61 volumes. West Publishing Company and
Edward Thompson Company. This new Code is the latest annotated edition of
all the general and permanent laws of the United States. It is kept up to date
by an annual cumulative supplement which is to be found in a pocket arrange-
ment in the back of each volume, and also by quarterly pamphlets which contain
laws and annotations supplementary to the latest pocket part. The Code includes
also a considerable amount of historical data, showing the antecedents of the
particular laws, with comments on the sources and the character of the changes.
The first three volumes contain the Constitution fully annotated. The last volume
contains a complete index to all the laws, and also a chronological table which
shows where the various laws contained in former statutes are to be found in the
Code. List of tables so represented are: Revised Statutes, Statutes at Large,
U. S. Compiled Statutes, Federal Statutes, Judicial Code, Criminal Code, Bank-
ruptcy Act, and a table of re6ealed Acts. Also in this volume is a "Table of
Acts cited by popular names". To illustrate, in its alphabetical order may be
found "National Prohibition Acts, Oct. 28, 1919, C. 85, 4-1 Stat. 305 (T. 27)",
etc., which means of course that this law was enacted on the date mentioned and
is chapter 85, United States Statutes at Large, page 305, and is to be found in the
volume of Title 17, in the U. S. Code Annotated. By using the tables this same
Act could readily be found in any of the other statutes above mentioned. Any
other Act which has a popular name, i. e., Sherman Anti-Trust Laws, may be
readily found by turning to this table. Due also to the many new editorial
features, the convenient size of the volumes, and the well known reputation of
the publishers, makes this a very excellent work on the subject.
Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading. By Charles E. Clark, Professor of Law at
Yale University. West Publishing Co., (Hornbook Series), 1929. A scholarly
and interesting work on the subject. The opening chapter, "History, Systems
and Functions of Pleading", reviews the origin and growth of pleadings system,
EDITOR's NoTE: It is sometimes convenient to know what recent texts, reports, etc., are available at
the Supreme Court Library, and Mr. Fred Y. Holland. of the Denver Bar, Librarian of the Supreme Court
Library, has kindly consented to supply Dicta monthly with brief notes as to new books received. It is
hoped this service may be of service to our readers.
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and contains the author's own observations upon future pleading reforms and
the rule of making powers of the courts. Except for this chapter the work is
devoted entirely to an analytical discussion of the problems of pleading, with the
usual citations of decisions of courts, and other writers. The usual Hornbook
arrangement is followed.
Hillyer's Corporate Management and By-Laws, with forms. By Curtis Hillyer, of the
California Bar, 1927. pp. 1349. Bender-Moss Co., San Francisco. This is a
splendid work on the subject. It covers briefly the law relating to the promotion,
organization, and management of private corporations. Includes also the Blue
Sky Laws of all the States. Mr. Hillyer is the author also of "Law of Evidence"
and "Hillyer's Justice Code".
How to Prove a Prima Facie Case. By Samuel Deutsch and Simon Balicer, both of
the New York bar. Prentice-Hall & Co., 1928, pp. 604. This work is of especial
interest to students and young practitioners. As stated "it indicates the elements
which are necessary to prove a prima facie case, and to demonstrate the practical
application of the rules of evidence by means of questions and answers." It is
essentially elementary, and should have been boiled down and sold for half the
price, or published gratuitously in a law school periodical.
Morse on Banks and Banking. Sixth Edition. By Harvey C. Voorhees, of the Boston
bar. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, pp. 2134. Since the publication of the First
edition in 1870 this work has been generally regarded as an authority on the
subject. However, beginning with the Third edition, revised by Frank Parsons
in 1888, very little new matter has been added to the original text. There has
been copied in the present edition some of the recent legislation on the subject,
including the Negotiable Instrument Laws, and Changes in the National Banking
Laws made by the McFadden-Pepper Act of 1927, and the Federal Reserve Act.
Therefore the work has been expanded from one to two volumes, and publishers'
price has been increased accordingly.
COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIrm's Norm-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
ATTORNEY FEES-CONTRACT FOR-NOT SEVERABLE-No.
12,577-Mutter vs. Burgess and Adams. Decided June 23,
1930.
Facts.-The plaintiffs, a law firm, were employed by the
defendant to defend him in an Alienation of Affections suit.
The written contract of employment provided for a retainer
of $1,000. Of this amount, $200 had been paid, and this suit
was brought for the balance. Before the determination of
the Alienation of Affections suit, the defendant accused the
plaintiffs of selling him out, and he also made other similarly
violent remarks concerning the plaintiffs' conduct in, the case.
The plaintiffs promptly withdrew, and brought this action
on the contract. The question presented is whether an attor-
ney, who has withdrawn from a case before he has fully per-
formed his contract, can recover his full fee. The trial court
gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
Held.-(1) In withdrawing, they did what any self-re-
specting lawyers would have done.
(2) Defendant's contention that the plaintiffs could not
sue on the contract, but should have sued on a quantum meruit,
or for damages for the breach of the contract was without
merit. Contracts of attorneys are exceptions to the rule that
an "employe can recover only the difference between what he
received or might have received from others and the price
agreed upon."
"One reason for the exception is that such service is not easily partible
or apportioned to the time or the labor performed or to be performed by the
attorney. Another reason is that often the most difficult and valuable services
of the attorney to his client are rendered in advising him of his legal rights
before any papers are prepared or appearances made in court. Another is
that by the contract the attorney loses the possible opportunity of employ-




12263-Bickes vs. The Travelers Insurance Company-De-
cided April 14, 1930.
Facts.-Margaret Bickes brought this action against The
Travelers Insurance Company for $10,000 on an accident in-
surance policy issued to her husband, Roy W. Bickes. The
evidence showed that plaintiff and the decedent had been
married for six years; that decedent was in good health; that
on October 1, 1927, he was in Trinidad, Colorado on business
and telephoned plaintiff saying that he would be home in a
few days; that about a week later he came home with a bump
on his forehead, elbows badly skinned, clothes soiled, etc. The
attending physician testified that decedent was irrational; that
he had an abrasion on the forehead which was, in his opinion,
the result of an external cause. Other physicians testified
similarly. At the end of the plaintiff's testimony the trial
court granted a nonsuit.
Held.-The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, and
it was proper to admit the testimony of the physicians that in
their opinion the injuries resulted from an external cause.
Judgment Reversed.
CANCELLATION OF DEED-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-Evi-
DENCE-No. 12,258-The American National Bank, Ad-
ministrator, Substituted for Mary E. Elwood, Deceased, Vs.
John L. Silverthorn-Decided April 28, 1930.
Facts.-Mary E. Elwood, during her lifetime lived with
her daughter, Martha, and Martha's husband, the defendant
here. In 1919 Elwood executed a warranty deed purporting
to convey to Martha certain real property. Thereafter Martha
conveyed to defendant here. A little later Martha died and
Elwood began this suit to set aside both the deed from her to
Martha and the deed from Martha to defendant, alleging that
the deed from her to Martha was delivered conditionally with
the express agreement that delivery was not to become effec-
tive until Elwood's death, and then only in case Martha sur-
vived her. The complaint also alleged that defendant knew
the conditions of the delivery. The trial court found, as a
matter of fact, that the delivery from Elwood to Martha was
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not conditional, and judgment was entered in favor of de-
fendant.
Held.-There is sufficient evidence to support the judg-
ment of the lower court which, therefore, will not be dis-
turbed.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-NO. 12368-People vs. Mooney. Decided
June 23, 1930.
Facts.-The defendant was charged with violation of
Sec. 3740 C. L. 1921 which provides that:
"This chapter shall extend to and include all theatres, circuses and
shows, where an admission fee is charged for entrance thereto. No person shall
be allowed by virtue of any such license to open any place of public amuse-
ment, such as a theatre, circus or show, on the Sabbath or Lord's day; but any
person who shall so offend on such a day shall be fined in a sum * * *."
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts and the
court dismissed the action.
Held.-"We would be violating one of the well recognized rules of
construction if we held that the statute applies to those who fail to procure
a license as well as to the licensees, because the language used in the statute
itself is applicable to those only who procure licenses, and those who violate
other provisions of the statute by failing to procure a license, might open
their theatres on the Sabbath or Lord's day, without fear of punishment.
This leads to a ridiculous and absurd conclusion, amounting to punishment
for one who honestly endeavors to comply strictly with every provision of the
statute, and a reward to the one who violates it.
"Before the defendant can be adjudged guilty, it is incumbent upon
the People to specify some particular act committed in violation of a public
law, either forbidding or commanding it. The statute under consideration
does not forbid the opening of a theatre on the Sabbath or Lord's day, and
the defendant has not violated any express provision of the statute. We are
unable to determine exactly what the legislature intended in passing this
section of the statute, with a violation of which this defendant is charged.
The statute under consideration is indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous; * * *"
CRIMINAL LAW-PRIOR CONVICTION-EvIDENCE-No. 12350
-Noble 0. Hamilton vs. The People of the State of Colo-
rado-Decided April 21, 1930.
Facts.-The evidence indicated that defendant Hamilton
was engaged with others in a confidence game whereby it was
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attempted to defraud a savings and loan company of a large
sum of money. Defendant brought error alleging that he was
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
and also on the ground that it was improperly brought out
at the trial that defendant and one Stone had been in the
penitentiary at the same time.
Held.-1. There is no rule that one accused of a crime
may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. 2. There was evidence indicating that defend-
ant and Stone had conspired in the penitentiary to work out
this fraud and it was, therefore, proper to show that they were
both in the penitentiary.
Insofar as this opinion is contrary to the decision in Ryan
vs. People, 66 Colorado 208; 180 Pacific 84, the earlier case
is overruled.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS-PETITION To SET ASIDE-GROUNDS
FOR-No. 12,514-Connell vs. Continental Casualty Com-
pany et al. Decided June 23, 1930.
Facts.-One Cunningham was granted compensation by
the Industrial Commission against Connell and the Casualty
Company. The Company sought a review in the District
Court. Though properly served, Connell failed to appear and
judgment was entered against him by default. The District
Court held that the insurance policy did not cover Cunning-
ham's injury, and the Commission was directed to dismiss as
to the Casualty Company. The policy covered only those em-
ployees of Connell that worked in his home in Denver. Cun-
ningham was injured while building a cabin for Connell at
Indian Hilts. Connell had been told by the insurance agent
that he was covered on his risk at Indian Hills before the
work was begun there. However, the proper entry had not
been made on the records of the Company. Connell, by this
action, seeks to set aside the default judgment, and his petition
to set aside was denied.
Held.-Without deciding what relief Connell has
against the Casualty Company because of the unkept promise
of its agent,
DICTA
(1) "Applications to vacate default judgments are addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court,"
and its decision will only be set aside when that discretion
has been abused.
(2) "To entitle a party to have a default judgment set aside for the
reasons assigned in this case, it must appear, not only that the default and
judgment were obtained by fraud, mistake, inadvertance, or excusable neglect,
but that prima facie there is a meritorious defense."
Judgment affirmed.
DIRECTED VERDICT-ERROR WHEN-No. 12,197-Sherman
Mercantile Company vs. Mountain Ice and Coal Company
and The Jagger Produce Company. Decided June 23,
1930.
Facts.-Action to recover the possession of eggs which
were stored by the plaintiff. The action was dismissed as to
the Mountain Ice and Coal Company by stipulation. The
plaintiff's evidence showed that the defendant secured mer-
chandise consisting of 327 cases of eggs, after having procured
a merchandise order in favor of one Richards, from one
Davidson, an employe of the plaintiff who, at the time, stated
that he had no authority to sign for the plaintiff. Previously,
the defendant had secured two orders from Richards, who was
indebted to the defendant, for the delivery of 51 cases of eggs
which were in storage for Richards. These two orders were
left blank so that the defendant could take them in such quan-
tities as they might wish. Defendant then used one of the
orders given him by Richards (for the 51 cases owned by
Richards) and made it out for the 327 cases for which the
unauthorized order to Richards from the plaintiff provided.
Defendant tlhen gave Richards credit on his account for the
327 cases. The entire transaction was repudiated by the
plaintiff and by Richards when they learned of it, and the
warehouse was given instructions not to turn the eggs over
to the defendant. Plaintiff then brought this action and the
court directed a verdict for the defendant.
Held.-"There was ample evidence to carry the case to the jury. It
was the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to the testimony."
Reversed.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-PURCHASE OF TAx CERTIFICATE-
INJUNCTION-NO. 12,225-Louis Werner vs. Eugene A.
Norden, et al-Decided April 28, 1930.
Facts.-Werner, the owner of the fee title to a lot in
Cripple Creek, brought an action alleging that Norden was
his tenant; that defendant Sennett conspired with Norden to
secure the assignment of a tax sale certificate, and thereby to
obtain for Norden a tax deed to the lot. The complaint prayed
for an injunction against the County Treasurer to prevent him
from issuing such tax deed, and offering to pay the amount
due under the tax sale certificate. The defendants' answer
made no proper denials of the pertinent facts in the com-
plaint. After the filing of the complaint, before the trial of
the cause, the Treasurer issued the tax deed to Sennett. The
lower court refused to grant plaintiff the relief which he
prayed for on the ground that the tax deed had already been
issued at the time of the trial, and that the question attempted
to be litigated by the plaintiff was moot.
Held.-A tenant may not either alone or in conspiracy
with any other person obtain the paramount title to land which
he holds in his capacity as tenant. The issuance of the tax
deed after the institution of the suit did not render the question
moot, but, on the other hand, such deed was of necessity subject
to the result of the litigation which had been started. The
plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to his injunction.
Judgment Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
MALPRACTICE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-EVIDENCE-No. 12218
-Daly vs. Lininger-Decided April 7, 1930.
Facts.-Daly, plaintiff below, sued Lininger, defendant
below, for damages for malpractice. The testimony shows
that Lininger operated on plaintiff's jaw; that during the
operation there was a hemorrhage causing such a flow of blood
that Lininger could not see clearly what he was doing, and as
a result the left inferior dental nerve was severed. The lower
court instructed the jury among other things, that the question
of whether Lininger had used reasonable skill and diligence
should be decided only from a preponderance of the evidence
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of the expert witnesses. The plaintiff objected to this instruc-
tion and asked the court to instruct the jury that this was one
of the class of cases in which the jury should be guided by
the common experience of mankind as well as by the testimony
of experts. Defendant also counterclaimed for the reasonable
value of his services, but the plaintiff in her replication denied
that there was anything due on account of such services. The
lower court directed a verdict for defendant on the counter-
claim and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
on plaintiff's complaint for damages.
Held.-The lower court erred in instructing the jury, and
the question of negligence should not be determined solely by
the testimony of expert witnesses. It was also error to direct
a verdict for the defendant on the cross complaint when the
pleadings showed that the plaintiff had denied that there was
anything due.
Judgment Reversed and a New Trial Ordered.
MINOR'S CONTRACTS-AGENT-JOINT CONTRACT-NO. 12266
-Bessie M. Sipes vs. L. E. Sipes, et al-Decided April 21,
1930.
Facts.-Daisy W. Sipes, the owner of a note and deed of
trust executed by Bessie M. Sipes, died leaving as her heirs at
law the defendants, L. E. Sipes, et al. The plaintiff sued L. E.
Sipes individually and all of the defendants as heirs at law,
setting forth that they were the owners of the note; that plain-
tiff agreed with L. E. Sipes as administrator and as agent for
the other defendants that the note and trust deed were to be
returned to plaintiff and that plaintiff was to convey the land
secured thereby to defendants. It appears that two of the
defendants are minors. The complaint prayed that if it
should be found that L. E. Sipes was the agent for the other
defendants, a reconveyance of the realty should be ordered.
If it should be found that he was not such agent, complaint
prayed for damages against him individually. The lower
court sustained the demurrer to the complaint.
Held.-The demurrer was properly sustained. To re-
convey was a joint obligation. The minors involved could not
be bound through a supposed agent, therefore, none of the
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defendants could be bound. There is no cause of action here
against L. E. Sipes personally as an agent acting beyond the
scope of his authority in presuming to deal for the minors
because there is no statement in the complaint that the plaintiff
was ignorant of the minority of two of the defendants.
Judgment Affirmed.
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL INJURY-PROXIMATE CAUSE-No.
12262-Stout, an infant, by O'Connell, his next friend vs.
Denver Park and Amusement Company-Decided April
14, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff, aged 19, was riding in a roller
coaster car belonging to defendant. Plaintiff testified that
during the course of the ride he was struck on the head by
some unknown object. He was not strapped in the car at the
time. He fell out of the car, was dragged along the track and
finally managed to get back into the car. In the course of the
fall he suffered an injury and brought this action to recover
damages from the defendant company alleging that its failure
to see that he was strapped in the car was the proximate cause
of the injury. The lower court entered a directed verdict for
the defendant.
Held.-In the absence of conflicting testimony, the
determination of the proximate cause was for the court. De-
fendant's failure to see that plaintiff was strapped in the car
was not the proximate cause, either alone or in conjunction
with the blow which plaintiff received on the head.
Judgment Affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURY-NEGLIGENCE-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-
No. 12386-Denver and Salt Lake Railway Company vs.
Lombardi-Decided April 21, 1930.
Facts.-Lombardi brought this action for damages alleg-
ing that he was a foreman for the Denver and Salt Lake Rail-
way Company; that certain blasting operations were being
carried on; that he stationed one Quintano to warn him of the
fall of any rocks; that Quintano did not warn him of the fall
of a rock which struck him and injured him. Quintano and
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another laborer both testified that Quintano had shouted at
the approach of the rock which injured plaintiff. Defendant
alleged that plaintiff had assumed the risk incident to the
operations in which he was engaged at the time of the accident.
Held.-Under the facts in this case the risks were not
assumed because they were not fully known and appreciated.
Judgment Affirmed.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION-FINDING OF FACT By-
ANTI-DUPLICATION ACT-No. 12,254-Utilities Commis-
sion et al vs. City of Loveland.
Facts.-This action is actually between the City and the
Public Service Company, each of which claims the exclusive
right to furnish certain territory adjacent to the City with
electricity. Under the socalled anti-duplication law, the Com-
pany filed a petition complaining that the defendant was in
the course of constructing an electric line over territory
already occupied by the Company. The City answered that
no certificate was necessary because the territory in dispute
was contiguous to its own lines, and was not already served
by the Company. The Commission sustained the Company's
petition and upon certiorari, the Commission's ruling was re-
versed by the District Court, and the petition was dismissed.
The Commission prosecuted a writ of error to review the de-
cision of the District Court.
Held.-"To sum up, we cannot say-that the Commission was not justi-
fied in its findings of fact and its orders and judgment based thereon. We
are not to be understood as saying that the Public Utilities Commission has
unlimited and *unrestricted power in making findings of fact and in entering
orders and decrees. It is sufficient to say in this case that no constitutional
or statutory provisions have been violated by the Commission and that the
evidence before it fully justified the orders which it made, and that the Dis-
trict Court either in a Code writ of certiorari or by the writ of review pro-
vided by the Utilities act, if there is any difference between them, was not
justified in its judgment setting aside the orders of the Utilities Commission."
Reversed and remanded.
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PLEADINGS-AMENDED COMPLAINT-EFFECT OF-RIGHT TO
FILE-NO. 12297-H. C. Burson vs. J. E. Adamson et al.-
Decided May 26,1930.
Facts.-This was an action to recover losses sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the alleged fraud, deceit, and con-
version of his property by the defendants. The complaint
originally embodied three separate causes of action for the one
wrong. To the complaint, the defendant filed a motion to
make more specific and certain. This motion was allowed
and an order of court was also had to make the plaintiff elect
as to which of the causes of action he would pursue. To the
plaintiff's bill of particulars, the defendant filed a motion to
strike the bill from the files, and to dismiss the complaint be-
cause the bill of particulars did not set out the information
which the court required, and for the further reason that the
bill of particulars was a sham pleading. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The defendant moved
to strike the amended complaint on the grounds that the court
had not granted leave to amend, and that the amended com-
plaint was a sham pleading, and also that in no sense did it
comply with the order of the court to make more specific, it
being ambiguous and merely a repetition of the original com-
plaint. The court, thereupon, of its own motion, dismissed
the action without prejudice.
Held.-l. The plaintiff, by compliance with the order
to elect which of his causes of action he would pursue, waived
the adverse ruling on this point. The court, however, infers
that the plaintiff need not have made the election.
2. When the plaintiff complied with the order to make
more specific and certain, he waived any error that might have
existed in granting the order. "All objections to rulings on
motions or demurrers attacking a complaint, except as to juris-
diction and want of facts are waived by answering over."
Williams vs. Smith 76 Colo. 151 and Erisman vs. McCarty
77 Colo. 289, wherein there is announced the doctrine that
error, if any, in overruling a demurrer to a complaint upon
the ground of insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of
action is waived by answering over, are expressly overruled.
3. By filing his amended complaint, the plaintiff waived
DICTA
error, if there was error, on the part of the court in striking
the bill of particulars.
4. An amended complaint should not be filed without
leave of the court.
Judgment Affirmed.
RAPE-EVIDENCE-OUTCRY - DELAY-No. 12572-Losasso
vs. People of the State of Colorado-Decided April 7,
1930.
Facts.-Losasso was convicted of statutory rape. The
evidence indicated that the offense was committed in May,
1929, that there was no outcry by the girl, and that the in-
formation was not filed until the following October. The
complaining witness testified variously that the offense was
committed May 9, May 16, and April 16. Losasso's counsel
contends that the delay in prosecution and the contradictions
in the testimony so weakened the case of the prosecutor that
the facts are insufficient to support the verdict.
Held.-This was a verdict rendered on conflicting evi-
dence and must stand.
Judgment Affirmed.
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